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Abstract
Background: Purchasing is a health financing function that involves the transfer of pooled resources to providers on
behalf of a covered population. Little attention has been paid to the extent to which the views of that population are
reflected in purchasing decisions. This article explores how purchasers in two financing mechanisms: the Formal Sector
Social Health Insurance Programme (FSSHIP) operating under the Nigerian National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS),
and the tax-funded health system perform their roles in light of their responsibilities to the populations.
Methods: A case study approach was adopted in which each financing mechanism is a case. Sixteen (16) in-depth
interviews with purchasers and eight (8) focus group discussions with beneficiaries were held. Agency and organizational
behavioural theories were used to characterise the purchaser-citizen relationships. A deductive framework approach was
used to assess whether actions identified in a model of ‘ideal’ strategic purchasing actions were undertaken in each case.
Results: For both cases, mechanisms exist to reflect people’s health needs in purchasing decisions, including
quantitative and qualitative needs assessment, mechanisms to raise awareness of benefit entitlements and allow
choice. However, purchasers do not use the mechanisms to effectively engage with and hold themselves accountable
to the people. In the tax-funded system, weak information systems and unclear communication channels between the
purchaser and citizens constrain assessment of needs; while timeliness of health information and poor engagement
practices of Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) are the main constraints in FSSHIP. Inadequate information
sharing in both mechanisms limits beneficiaries’ awareness of entitlements. Although beneficiaries of FSSHIP can choose
providers, lack of information on the quality of services offered by providers constrains rational decision-making and the
inability to change HMOs reduces HMO responsiveness to beneficiary needs.
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Conclusions: Responsiveness and accountability to beneficiaries are undervalued by purchasers in both financing
mechanisms. In the tax-funded system, civil society organisations can facilitate engagement and accountability of
purchasers and the people. In FSSHIP, NHIS needs to provide stronger stewardship of HMOs to promote effective
engagement with members. Furthermore, the NHIS should introduce mechanisms that allow FSSHIP members to choose
their own HMO, which could encourage HMOs to be more responsive to members.
Keywords: Strategic purchasing, Public accountability, Citizen engagement, Community participation, Tax-funded system,
Formal sector social health insurance program, National Health Insurance Scheme, Nigeria
Background
Purchasing is a key function of health care financing
and is the process through which purchasers, on
behalf of the population, transfer pooled resources to
health care providers in exchange for health care ser-
vices [1]. That is, purchasers act as agents for people
in the purchase of health care services. Accordingly,
to fulfil this agency role effectively, it is important for
purchasers to ensure there are effective mechanisms
in place to determine and reflect people’s needs, pref-
erences and values in purchasing decisions, and to
hold themselves accountable to the population for
which they are responsible [2].
Many of the studies that examine health care purchas-
ing have emphasised the relationship between pur-
chasers and providers of services by examining contracts
and provider payment mechanisms [3, 4]. However, little
attention has been given to the roles and responsibilities
of purchasers in relation to the people they represent.
This article focuses on the purchaser-citizen relationship
for two health care financing mechanisms that operate
in Enugu State, Nigeria: the tax-funded health system
and the Formal Sector Social Health Insurance
Programme (FSSHIP) that operates under the National
Health Insurance scheme (NHIS). Specifically, the pur-
pose of the article is to examine how the purchaser in
each system performs their roles and responsibilities to
the population they serve based on a model of ‘ideal’
strategic purchasing actions.
The tax-funded system
Under the Enugu State’s tax-funded system, the State
Ministry of Health (SMoH) purchases and provides
public health services for the entire state population.
Residents of the state can elect to use these services.
The SMoH defines a minimum package of health care
services which covers promotive, preventive, and
curative care at primary and secondary care levels, and in-
cludes services for communicable and non-communicable
diseases, child survival, safe motherhood, nutrition,
health education, laboratory services and community
mobilisation [5]. SMoH also engages a number of pri-
vate providers to deliver selected services, including
mortuary and immunisation services. Services that are
not on the SMoH’s package of services are mostly
paid out-of-pocket with user fee required at the point
of service utilization.
Health services are predominantly funded through
general tax revenue, which the State Government
allocates to SMoH as part of the State Budget. All
government owned primary and secondary providers are
involved in service delivery. Although primary health
care falls under the purview of the Local Government
Area (LGA), SMoH releases resources to Primary Health
Centres (PHCs) for vertical programmes and pays
salaries of state public servants and some senior level
health workers at the LGAs. The LGA, in turn, pays sal-
aries to all other PHC workers.
The formal sector health insurance Programme (FSSHIP)
FSSHIP is a Social Health Insurance programme estab-
lished under the Nigerian National Health Insurance
Scheme (NHIS). FSSHIP is a mandatory scheme for em-
ployees in the formal sector [6]. As of 2012, coverage
was estimated to be about 3% of the population of
Nigeria. [7]. Beneficiary contributions to the scheme are
based on a proportion of earnings and are accompanied
by contributions from employers (employers pay 3.25%
of the employee’s consolidated salary while employees
pay 1.75%). The NHIS pools funds at the federal level
through the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF).
NHIS contracts private, for-profit Health Maintenance
Organisations (HMOs) to administer the purchasing
system and channel resources to providers. Healthcare
providers receive capitation payments for primary
healthcare services and fee-for-service for secondary ser-
vices. A mix of NHIS-accredited public and private
health care providers are contracted to deliver services
under the FSSHIP.
FSSHIP provides a standard benefit package that
specifies primary, secondary and tertiary services, with
some exclusions for high technology investigations (CT
scans, MRI, etc.) and occupational diseases [6]. FSSHIP
members are allocated to specific HMOs, but can
choose their primary health care providers from an
NHIS accredited provider list.
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Methods
This study was undertaken as part of a multi-country study
that examined purchasing functions in 10 countries in Africa
and Asia [8]. The multi-country study employed a case study
approach in which individual purchasing mechanisms were
the cases. The Nigerian study selected two mechanisms for
examination: the tax-funded system in Enugu state and the
Formal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme
(FSSHIP). The citizen-purchaser relationship was the unit of
analysis for this paper. The study examined whether there
was a difference in the citizen-purchaser relationship
between the tax-funded system, where both purchasers and
providers belong to the same organisation, and the social
health insurance system, where there is organisational separ-
ation between purchasers and providers. FSSHIP is financed
at the federal level but operates at the state level with benefi-
ciaries being federal government employees and other formal
sector workers. FSSHIP and the tax-funded system are the
main health purchasing mechanisms operating in Nigeria.
Study setting
The study was conducted in Enugu state in 2014.
Enugu, with a population of about 3.9 million in 2013
[9], is one of 36 states in Nigeria and is located in
the South-eastern zone with four other states. The
South-east is one of six (6) constitutionally recognised
geopolitical zones in Nigeria.
States are grouped into zones based on cultural, histor-
ical, and political relationships; the states in each zone
have broadly similar patterns and levels of development.
In Enugu, there are 17 LGAs, 291 political wards, 471
communities and an urban-rural population ratio of 5:12.
Data collection
Document review, individual in-depth interviews (IDIs)
and focus group discussions (FGDs) were used to collect
data for the study. For the tax-funded system, six (6)
IDIs were held with respondents from the Ministry of
Health and six (6) FGDs were conducted with
community members from each of the three purpos-
ively selected communities (2 FGD per community).
One community was selected from each of the three
senatorial zones. For the FSSHIP, a total of ten (10)
IDIs were held; six (6) with HMOs and four (4) with
NHIS employees. Two (2) FGDs (one male and one
female group) were held with beneficiaries of the
scheme.
The interview respondents were purposively selected
to include the key actor groups involved in healthcare
purchasing in the two mechanisms. The conceptual
framework described in the following section guided the
mapping of the key actor groups. FGD participants in
the FSSHIP were beneficiaries of the scheme selected
from federal institutions operating in the state. In the
tax system, FGD participants were male and female
community members recruited from the three senatorial
zones. At least one participant was a Facility Health
Committee (FHC) member. The officer in charge of
health facility that operated in the study community
assisted in the recruitment of community members.
Initial mapping of actors based on information areas
was used to determine the possible number of inter-
views. However, interviews were discontinued when no
new information was obtained from the focus groups
[10]. In addition, the tax funded system has wider cover-
age hence the need to conduct interviews in all three
senatorial zones. The FGDs and IDIs were used to assess
beneficiary views on key strategic purchasing actions in
the relationship between citizens and purchasers.
Both IDIs and FGDs were conducted by members of
the research team; a moderator and a note taker
attended each interview. Note takers ensured that the
key points for each question were covered and that
follow-up questions and prompts were explored. FGDs
were primarily run in the native language [Igbo] while
IDIs were held in English with respondents at liberty to
communicate in either of the two languages. Individual
interviews and FGDs were audio recorded with the con-
sent of participants. All interviews were transcribed and
those in Igbo were translated into English. Transcribers
were well versed in both the Igbo and English languages.
The moderators and note takers checked the accuracy of
the transcripts against the audio recordings.
A review of grey literature including the 2010-2015
Strategic Health Development Plan, and 2014 Health
Policy documentation from the Ministry of Health, the
Ministry of Finance and the Planning Department.
Government records, including the 2013 and 2014
expenditure reports, budget performance reports, health
financing policy documents, health sector reports and
presentations at meetings, were examined to determine
the context for and expected function of purchasing
arrangements as described in the policy design.
Analytical framework
The multi-country study used a conceptual framework
that identified principal-agent relationships between:
purchasers and providers; purchasers and citizens; and
purchasers and the government [11]. Under agency the-
ory, agents have specific roles to play for their relevant
principals [12]. The multiple relationship purchasing
framework was used to identify a list of ideal strategic
purchasing actions which was compared with policy
design and actual practice in order to identify key design
and implementation gaps [13].
This article focuses on the relationship between
citizens and purchasers and considers the actions that
purchasing organisations, as agents, are expected to
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undertake in order to: be responsive to the needs and
preferences of the population they cover (principals);
accountable to the people; and ensure people access
their entitlements [2]. A broad conceptual framework
for strategic purchasing was developed to identify key
actions that purchasers, in their role as people’s agent,
are expected to undertake [8, 14], including:
1. Assessment of the service needs, preferences and
values of the population and use of this information
to specify service entitlements/benefits;
2. Informing the population of their entitlements and
obligations;
3. Ensuring that the population can access their
entitlements;
4. Receiving and responding to complaints and
feedback from the population; and
5. Allowing people to choose/exit a purchaser and/or
provider.
Organisational behavioural theory suggests that, of the
above-listed actions, 1, 4, and 5 can be viewed as either
‘voice’ or ‘exit’ mechanisms to influence purchaser
decision-making [15]. While ‘voice’ mechanisms, such as
public consultation, advocacy groups, complaint mecha-
nisms, and formal representation of people on purchasing
boards, − allow people to express opinions; ‘exit’ strategies
allow people to choose purchasers and/or providers and
express dissatisfaction by leaving a specific purchasing
mechanism or changing an assigned provider.
Determination of how a particular purchaser-citizen
relationship is functioning involves the examination of
voice and exit mechanisms, and mechanisms that hold
purchasers accountable to people (action 2 above) and
ensure that people’s entitlements are fulfilled (action 3
above) [15].
Data analysis
Interview transcripts were the primary data analysed.
QSR NVivo 10 was used to organize and manage data.
A deductive framework approach was used to analyse
the data. The study used the list of actions identified
above as the ‘theoretical ideal’ and determined whether
those actions were reflected in the policy design in each
case (i.e. the tax-funded system and FSSHIP) and how
the mechanisms functioned in actual practice in order to
identify gaps in both the policy design and implementation.
Results
Using the analytical framework presented in the Methods
section, the findings for each purchasing mechanism are
presented according to five themes: (1) assessment of the
health needs of beneficiaries; (2) ensuring beneficiary
awareness of entitlements and obligations; (3) receiving
and addressing complaints; (4) ensuring access to entitle-
ments; and (5) strategies for promoting choice and right
to exit.
Assessment of health needs and update of entitlements
to reflect needs, preferences, and values of the
population
In both mechanisms, two main needs assessment strat-
egies were identified: (1) processes that aim to collect
routine epidemiological data on service utilization; and
(2) formal engagement with beneficiaries to elicit their
needs and preferences for the services they receive.
Routine health data collection
In the tax-funded system, the MoH collects routine
health service data through the Health Management
Information System (HMIS). Reports and statistics on
services utilized at health facilities are intended to in-
form health planning and priority setting. However,
MoH respondents indicated that routine data are weak
and unreliable for determining needs and making mean-
ingful decisions and plans. Data quality and subsequent
usage are compromised due to problems associated with
the capacity of human resources, the timeliness of col-
lection and completeness of data reporting:
“The information is not coming when it is due. In
many of the [health] centres, some of the information
officers are not functioning as required; to get
statistical information is a problem, even if you get the
information, what about the quality? You can’t be sure
of the data you are getting. So, we have been working
hard to improve on all those things so that at least it
will help us in planning.” (IDI 6, MoH respondent)
In the FSSHIP, HMOs are expected to compile and
transmit patient encounter data to NHIS on a quarterly
basis. The data is gathered at the health facility level and
is intended to highlight disease burden and utilization
rates. According to a respondent from an HMO:
“There is an encounter data form, which is an
instrument we use to collect data on utilization and
service delivery. The encounter data is used in various
ways. The major thing is for you to ascertain the level
of utilization. For instance, do you have up to 13% of
enrolees coming to a hospital; is it 3% or 50%? It
shows what percentage of the enrolees you have that
are coming. It also shows the disease burden in that
particular region.” (IDI 1, HMO respondent)
There was consensus that the required information is
not transmitted as designed because many providers do
not compile and make these data available. This was
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partly attributed to the broad engagement of providers
with (multiple) HMOs, and larger health facilities, in
particular, are unlikely to deliver monthly patient
documentation:
“Some [providers] are complying but many don’t. The
problem is that majority of them are from very big
hospitals where they have a lot of activities with other
HMOs and a lot of things to do [...] But whenever they
come, we compile them and send.” (IDI 4, HMO
respondent)
Engagement mechanisms
Facility Health Committees (FHCs) serve as a means to
engage citizens in the tax-funded health system. The
FHC is a community-based arrangement that is estab-
lished to offer a sustainable channel for promoting citi-
zen voice and to encourage greater accountability and
responsiveness in the health system [16]. Committee
members are selected through community-based demo-
cratic processes (voting at an open community meeting);
and based on their trustworthiness and stated willing-
ness to work for their community. Committee members
are primarily responsible for: regular interaction with
health workers at their designated facilities; regular
interaction with members of their local community to
understand health needs; providing feedback and liaising
with the MoH on their community’s health. These com-
mittees have been established in most primary and sec-
ondary health facilities in the state. Most FHCs carry out
their responsibilities in consulting both health workers
and community members to identify needs, but health
services are often not improved and identified needs re-
main unmet:
“They ask questions to know the state of things; after
asking those questions, at the end of the day, we won’t
see any improvements.” (FGD 1, beneficiary of tax-
funded system)
Problems relating to unclear communication channels
between the FHCs and MoH and the bureaucratic
protocols involved in meeting policy makers limit FHC
performance:
“What we are talking about is, the protocols that are
involved in seeing them [policy makers] are the issue.”
(FGD 6, beneficiary of tax-funded system).
“What we want is to have an effective avenue for
communication. Now that we have laid our
complaints, how do we get them to the Ministry of
Health or those in authority so that the problems can
be solved? That is our problem.” (FGD 3, beneficiary
of tax-funded system).
Although, by design, volunteerism and stewardship to
community are emphasized values for FHC committee
members, some provisions have been made for minor,
non-monetary incentives, such as recognition in the
community and, in the past, some non-governmental
agencies provided monetary incentives to FHC members
[17]. Currently, the absence of formal incentives further
constrains active participation by some members of the
FHC committee.
“You know that it’s not easy to pull out a family man
to spend hours on free work. If you call him 2-3 times,
the next time he’ll tell you that he is on the farm.... So,
if the ministry gave him stipend at the end of the
month, it would be of great help.” (FGD 2, beneficiary
of tax-funded system)
Under the FSSHIP, HMOs are mandated to conduct
quarterly seminars/interactive sessions to educate bene-
ficiaries on the scope of benefit entitlements, rights, and
privileges. In addition, these forums provide the oppor-
tunity to assess beneficiaries’ satisfaction with services
delivered, and receive complaints, suggestions, and
recommendations. Most HMOs report conducting these
seminars and engaging with beneficiaries to understand
their needs, but beneficiaries expressed mixed responses,
with the majority suggesting inadequate and limited
engagement with HMOs:
“Let them [HMO’s] frequent wherever they are
assigned, and let their [beneficiary] voice be heard.
They are the link between the NHIS and the hospitals
[providers] and the beneficiary; let them come close, so
that we can talk to them. If we have any complaints,
let’s have their [telephone] numbers, maybe the
official’s [telephone] number so that we can reach
them one-on-one. I have not received my NHIS number.
But if they have been coming, somehow, I would have
got my number. They need to do their work! They need
to do their work!” (FGD 1, FSSHIP beneficiary).
It was also acknowledged that the nature of the en-
gagement does not allow for the views of all to be repre-
sented as the forums involve few people from selected
institutions:
“Like I have just said, there are 64 in the office, and I
was the only person that came for that meeting. I
believe that it would have been okay if others were
given opportunity to air their views.” (FGD 2, FSSHIP
beneficiary)
Ibe et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2017) 16:216 Page 5 of 11
In general, beneficiaries assert that their preferences for
service delivery are not met. For example, problems with
long waiting times, quality of services, drugs and overall
poor treatment of scheme patients when compared to fee-
paying patients have been repeatedly expressed but not
yet addressed. However, one HMO noted that input from
beneficiary engagement was the basis for the revision of
the initial benefit package to include some of the services
previously on the exclusion list:
“The comments we get, we try to feedback to NHIS
that these are what people are saying. For instance,
the issue of Myomectomy - at the commencement, it
wasn’t there, that is a fibroid operation. That has been
changed. The issue of maternity care, before it was
limited to a particular group of people but now it’s
open to all women to have four live births irrespective
of the number of births they had before they joined the
scheme.” (IDI 6, HMO respondent).
Mechanisms through which purchasers ensure beneficiary
awareness of entitlements and obligations
In the tax-funded system, Enugu State health law recog-
nises the right to health as Government’s obligation to
the citizens. The State Patient Rights Charter, an elabor-
ation of the health law, specifies the rights, entitlements,
and obligations of patients as service users. Posters
indicating the contents of the charter are expected to be
displayed in strategic locations at all public health facil-
ities. The charter is intended to stimulate a change in
citizen behaviour by provision of adequate knowledge of
legal rights. Although posters are displayed in most
public health facilities, the information provided has had
little impact; patients remain largely unaware of their
rights and do not demand that they be upheld:
“Our awareness of rights is poor. We have what is
called Patients’ Rights Charter. We paste it on the
wall. But I am almost 2 years here now and I have not
gotten a patient who said, “doctor, see this person
refuses to explain the cost of this drug to me”; “It is in
the charter”; or “This person is supposed to be on duty
or is supposed to be attending but he comes to work at
10am.” That’s why I said our rights awareness is still
very poor.” (IDI 4, public provider respondent)
One policy maker observed arrangements were being
made to inform the public about the services available at
hospitals:
“In our district hospitals, we now have community
mobilization officers working with us. So they will
mobilize communities to take-up the health services
offered in their community.” (IDI 4, MoH respondent)
For the FSSHIP, the rights of beneficiaries are stipu-
lated in the scheme’s operational guidelines, including
the specification that patients can exercise their rights.
Through continuous education, HMOs are required to
ensure that new and existing beneficiaries are aware of
the procedures for choosing and changing primary
healthcare providers, the criteria for assessment of care,
and the scope of benefit coverage. These activities are
reportedly being carried out by HMOs:
“We intermittently organize forums. The HMOs are
able to use that opportunity to tell their enrolees their
rights and privileges, which is their benefit package.”
(IDI 1, NHIS respondent)
However, beneficiary respondents indicated there was
limited awareness of the scope of benefits and entitle-
ments among the majority of beneficiaries. The same
group suggested that using the media would achieve wider
coverage rather than the current, infrequent forums.
Limited awareness of rights has often led to providers
making unnecessary financial demands from beneficiaries:
“Many people don’t even know their rights. You get to
the hospital and you are expected to pay just 10% for
the drugs. Sometimes, if you get to the hospital and
you are not aware of that, the people [hospital] will
just extort you; take money from you that they are not
supposed to. We want a situation where we know…if
government has a registry of the services that we are
entitled to receive, we want to have copies so that
everybody knows how much is required from us [co-
payment]. We want to know. And on the issue of
drugs, giving us cheap drugs and all that, we also
want it addressed.” (FGD 2, FSSHIP beneficiary).
Mechanisms to receive and address complaints
Complaint and redress policy in the tax-funded system
stipulates complaint lodgement procedures and appro-
priate actions in the event that grievances are not satis-
factorily resolved. The policy further specifies that
providers should pay utmost respect to patients’ opin-
ions and rights within the health system:
“We are trying to inculcate some level of discipline
and decorum in the facilities’ staff, so that they handle
the patients with care.” (IDI 9, MoH respondent)
In terms of seeking resolution, many people are not aware
of their rights and are reluctant to complain due to a lack of
awareness of processes and little confidence to do so:
“Well, the citizens are not properly informed. In short,
they don’t know their rights most of the time. Someone
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may go to the hospital and he is not properly treated
but he finds it difficult to complain. It’s like a cultural
issue” (IDI 4, MoH respondent).
A second redress mechanism that is stipulated in pol-
icy is the placing of opinion/complaints boxes at all pub-
lic health facilities. In practice, many facilities do not
have complaint boxes and, where they do exist, they are
not considered useful as they are often poorly secured
meaning complains do not reach health authorities:
“If you put your concerns into those boxes, someone
may even take it before it gets to the authority. […] It
has no key. The one here is like box. It is broken and
someone else can have access to anything you put
there.” (FGD 4, beneficiaries of tax funded system)
Similarly, the HMOs are required to install complaint
boxes at provider facilities, periodically conduct satisfac-
tion surveys, and establish 24-h help lines to receive and
address beneficiary complaints [6]. All HMOs attest to
having functional help lines and responses from respon-
dents also affirm that mechanisms do exist for them to
express discontent either by phone, face-to-face during
meetings or through scheduled visits from officers (staff
of agencies/ministries that have been appointed by
HMOs to serve as intermediaries between the agency
and their HMO). Despite these mechanisms, beneficiar-
ies assert that complaints, especially those relating to
provider behaviour and overall service delivery, are sel-
dom addressed and feedback rarely provided by HMOs:
“They [HMOs] encourage us to complain about bad
treatment and things like that, but after that what
happens? Nothing, because we have made series of
complaints, but the thing stops there because when
you go back to your provider, they still mete out the
same treatment.” (FGD 2, FSSHIP beneficiary)
The main reason reported for poor response to com-
plaints is the limited competition for beneficiaries
among HMOs and over-centralization of decision-
making by NHIS - most decisions are taken at the
national level and take time to be enacted at the
community level.
Mechanisms for purchasers to ensure the population can
access their entitlements
In the tax-funded system, primary and secondary public
providers are set up and managed by the government
and members of the public can directly access care from
these providers according to need and ability to pay stip-
ulated fees. Assessment of secondary services is based
on referral. The MoH tries to regulate user fees and drug
charges so that accessing health services remains afford-
able to patients. The provision of free MCH services for
pregnant women, and children under-5 is a further
measure to ensure access for vulnerable groups. A
district-based health system (DHS) was implemented to
decentralize health services and resources to ensure
access to services by directly linking primary and
secondary care in each locality. The DHS was expected
to meet the infrastructural and human resource redistri-
bution needs by establishing, at a minimum, a primary
health facility (PHC) in every ward, while also strength-
ening referral lines [5]:
“There is no part of this state that is excluded from
this district health system… Some communities have
health facilities within them but the ones that don’t
were linked to a facility that is closest to them.” (IDI 2,
MoH respondent)
The implementation of the DHS has improved con-
struction of health facilities, especially primary care facil-
ities, in many previously under-served areas. However,
there have not been corresponding increases in human
resources, health services and the availability of drugs
and medical equipment:
“We are handicapped in so many areas, not just the
personnel, but also in the supply of drugs and the
other equipment, so the services are not up to the
standards that are expected.” (IDI 1, MoH
respondent)
To access health services, HMOs register beneficiaries
and issue identification cards. Some beneficiaries re-
ported protracted delays in obtaining registration cards
from NHIS. Accessing referral services requires pre-
treatment authorization from the relevant HMO within
24 h of the request from the provider facility. Beneficiaries
expressed concerns about recurring delays in authorization
of referrals by HMOs, which often prevented patients from
receiving referral services:
“There was a day I was there [at hospital] till evening
and I didn’t get the go ahead from the HMO, and they
[provider] asked me to go [home]. Assuming I had an
ailment that could kill me, then I’ll not get help...I
don’t understand the reason.” (FGD 3, FSSHIP
beneficiary)
Other barriers to accessing necessary care include the
limited availability of NHIS approved drugs, leading to
frequent out-of-pocket payment for drugs; and poor
treatment of scheme patients compared to fee-paying
patients.
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“…NHIS patients are like the riffraff, poor people, the
common masses, the nobodies. And so any time you
come in there under the platform of NHIS, they look
down on you, you don’t get the attention you require.”
(FGD 2, FSSHIP beneficiary).
Existence of choice and exit strategies
While beneficiaries of the tax-funded system can decide
whether to seek publicly-provided care, the mandatory
nature of the FSSHIP limits the scope of beneficiaries to
exit the scheme if they are federal civil servants. Further-
more, staffs from federal ministries, departments, and
agencies (MDAs) are assigned to certain HMOs and
beneficiaries are not allowed to switch HMOs, even
if they are dissatisfied with that HMO. Respondents
were of the view that absence of choice of HMOs has
led to a nonchalant attitude towards performing man-
dated tasks for beneficiaries by HMOs:
“If we had the chance to change HMOs, they would try
to find out what we need. So am suggesting that
[allowing beneficiaries to change HMOs] so that the
establishment can move en masse.” (FGD 1, FSSHIP
beneficiary)
Beneficiaries are free to choose their own primary pro-
vider and change providers after an initial six (6) month
period. However, beneficiaries indicated that no criteria
have been defined by NHIS to help them to gauge the
performance of healthcare providers or of service
quality. Beneficiaries’ opinions of providers are largely
based on discussions with other beneficiaries, and such
judgements are sometimes made using incorrect or un-
substantiated information:
“I just changed from Hospital A to Hospital B; but I
just noticed that hospital A was even better than the
place I’m at now. So, I’m just on the high sea, I do not
know what to do again.” (FGD 2, FSSHIP beneficiary).
Discussion
This study examined the mechanisms used to reflect
the needs and preferences of beneficiaries in two
healthcare financing mechanisms: the Nigerian tax-
funded system and the FSSHIP. It also compared how
these financing arrangements function in practice in
light of an “ideal” strategic purchasing model. The
study found that the policy includes various mecha-
nisms to allow purchasers to undertake strategic
purchasing actions. These mechanisms include the
use of specific strategies to assess the health needs of
beneficiaries, raise awareness of beneficiaries’ rights
and entitlements, address beneficiary concerns, and
ensure access to health services. However, the stra-
tegic purchasing mechanisms operating under the tax-
funded system are not effectively implemented and/or
managed, and variations in how the strategic purchas-
ing mechanisms are implemented were observed in
the FSSHIP. The root causes of implementation gaps
vary for the two healthcare financing systems.
In both mechanisms, deliberate design of institutional
arrangements is required for mechanisms that allow
people to make their opinions known (voice mecha-
nisms) to be effective. The design should include clear
channels of communication between health system users
and decision-makers, with user-responsive management
arrangements also implemented [18]. In the tax-funded
system, voice mechanisms relating to needs assessment,
member/community engagement devices and complaint
systems that enable people’s needs and preferences to be
reflected in purchasing decisions all operate independ-
ently and are not specifically integrated into the design
and review of benefit entitlements. Consequently, bene-
fits do not necessarily reflect the expressed needs and
preferences of those who they are designed to help.
Effectively engaging and reflecting the needs of benefi-
ciaries in purchasing decisions remains a weakness of
the FSSHIP. Voice mechanisms for engaging with bene-
ficiaries and addressing complaints are supposed to be
implemented by HMOs and the NHIS is supposed to
oversee the implementation of these mechanisms.
However, individual HMOs have not implemented these
mechanisms according to the FSSHIP guidelines.
Consequently, beneficiary engagement mechanisms are
rarely robust or sufficiently inclusive to achieve intended
outcomes.
A major cause of the implementation gaps in voice
mechanisms under the tax system is weak information
systems for the generation and transmission of quality,
accurate and timely information for use in planning and
decision-making. Ineffective community engagement
processes and unclear lines of communication in the
processes have widened the communication gap between
purchasers and citizens and reduced the ability of voice
mechanisms to achieve their intended purpose. Under
the FSSHIP, implementation gaps are mainly associated
with poor beneficiary engagement processes. The poor
processes are due to a lack of coordination and inad-
equate supervision of the HMO practices by NHIS,
which has resulted in HMOs neglecting their roles and
responsibilities to FSSHIP members.
Raising community and beneficiary awareness of enti-
tlements appears to be undervalued in the tax system.
Voice mechanisms function on the existence of in-
formed users with some level of power to influence [15],
however the tax system does not include this group. The
patient charter has received limited attention from MoH
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and has not been implemented in such a way that it
achieves its intended purpose; beneficiaries have limited
awareness of rights and lack of power to influence pur-
chasing decisions. Under the FSSHIP, systems for in-
creasing member awareness of benefit entitlements are
specified in the policy design. The contract between
HMOs and NHIS specifies that HMOs must implement
such systems however, implementation of these tools has
not occurred as intended because poor engagement
mechanisms also weaken information exchange resulting
in low levels of awareness of entitlements by program
beneficiaries [19].
Community accountability mechanisms are intended
as useful tools for enhancing purchaser accountability
and responsiveness while also empowering citizens. The
tax-funded system uses the FHCs as an accountability
mechanism to communities. In practice, the blurred
lines of communication and feedback between the FHCs
and the MoH weaken mutual accountability. The litera-
ture indicates that properly functioning committees exist
in Nigeria and elsewhere to manage facility resources,
identify population needs, improve community partici-
pation, address complaints and manage overall quality
management [16, 20, 21]. The results from this study
corroborate the literature but also indicate the main
constraints to FHC performance are issues associated with
incentives, clarity of roles, and proper communication
channels. While a contractual agreement exists between
the HMOs, healthcare providers and NHIS in the FSSHIP,
the roles of citizens appear to be downplayed due to the
absence of explicit contracts and mechanisms through
which beneficiaries can directly hold HMOs accountable.
Under the tax-funded system, the implementation of
DHS contributed to the proliferation of healthcare
facilities in all geographic localities, but shortages and
geographic imbalances in the distribution of human
resources in the public sector constitute a significant
barrier to access. Consequently, many people are still
unable to access necessary healthcare services, especially
in under-served areas. Under the FSSHIP, the self-
serving behaviour of some HMOs can and do constrain
access to care, particularly for secondary services which
require authorization by HMOs prior to use. The often
deliberate efforts by some HMOs to control the volume
of service utilization can have significant negative im-
pacts on beneficiaries when they are denied their entitled
healthcare or made to contribute out-of-pocket pay-
ments [22].
Purchasing mechanisms can include strategies that
allow beneficiaries the right of exit and choice. When
faced with a loss of customers, increased competition
among providers and purchasers can bring improve-
ments in service quality [18]. While there are no explicit
exit mechanisms for beneficiaries in the tax-funded
system, the health system generally allows exit when
users decide to use non-public sector facilities and ser-
vices. Although the FSSHIP allows choice of primary
care providers, a lack of information on the quality of
healthcare from different providers limits the ability of
members to make rational decisions on the choice of
healthcare providers. Conversely, the absence of choice
of HMOs for FSSHIP members has created little incen-
tive for competition among HMOs and has weakened
the ability of FSSHIP members to compel purchasers to
be responsive to their health needs.
For purchasing to support progress towards the
achievement of health system and universal coverage
goals, purchasers must recognise the need to actively en-
gage the citizens in determining the right combination
of services and align resource allocation to health needs.
Improved mutual accountability between purchasers and
populations they cover is necessary for increased citizen
voice and purchaser responsiveness [11]. While the
introduction of strategic purchasing measures remains a
challenge, some experiences can be drawn from other
country practices. Thailand’s Universal Coverage Scheme
(UCS) provides some lessons on how strategic purchas-
ing can evolve over time given the right prerequisites
and enabling environment [23].
A limitation of this study is that the two financing
mechanisms examined target different groups of the
population which may affect the comparison of the rela-
tionship between purchasers and beneficiaries between
mechanisms. The findings should be interpreted in this
context. The two financing mechanisms were selected
because they represent the two largest healthcare finan-
cing arrangements operating in the state, providing the
opportunity for governments to learn important lessons
for health system reform and universal health coverage.
Conclusions
Both the tax-funded system and the FSSHIP include
mechanisms that allow purchasers to reflect people’s
needs, choices, and preferences in purchasing decisions.
The mechanisms include quantitative and qualitative
assessment of health needs, mechanisms to raise aware-
ness on benefit entitlements and mechanisms that allow
choice. However, purchasers are not using the mecha-
nisms effectively to engage and hold themselves account-
able to people they represent. The MoH, HMOs and
NHIS appear to give little value to their responsibilities
to the people, which is the root cause of the implemen-
tation gaps in the voice mechanisms described in policy.
Under the FSSHIP, the NHIS’s lack of stewardship over
the HMOs, who undertake purchasing administration,
has resulted in variations in how HMOs have imple-
mented voice and accountability mechanisms. In
addition, under FSSHIP, the inability of members to
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choose HMOs does not encourage HMOs to be respon-
sive to the needs and preferences of members.
Public purchasers should re-evaluate and strengthen
their awareness of their roles and responsibilities to the
people they represent, and be more responsive and ac-
countable to the people. Civil society organisations (CSOs)
have a role to play in empowering people to make their
opinions known and facilitate purchaser engagement with
the people. Furthermore, under the tax-funded system, as
the current definition of services provided in the public
sector is based on monitoring information from health fa-
cilities, information systems must be strengthened and the
accuracy and timeliness of information improved.
The NHIS should be mindful of the consequences of
being unable to meet FSSHIP members’ needs and
preferences – the scheme currently suffers from low
uptake rates and does not receive sufficient resources
from member contributions to cover operating costs.
Alternative strategies for improving beneficiaries’ under-
standing of entitlements are necessary to improve par-
ticipation. The NHIS should also provide stronger
stewardship to HMOs and encourage HMOs to engage
with and become accountable to their members.
Furthermore, the NHIS should introduce mechanisms
that allow FSSHIP members to choose HMOs, facilitat-
ing HMO responsiveness to members.
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